Fundamental rights concerning biomedicine in the Constitutional Treaty and their effect on the diverse legal systems of member states by Krajewska, Atina
  
SPECIAL ISSUE – UNITY OF THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION 
 
 
Fundamental Rights Concerning Biomedicine in the 
Constitutional Treaty and their Effect on the Diverse 
Legal Systems of Member States 
 




A.  Introduction 
 
The Constitutional Treaty1 was thought to address the new challenges occurring in 
front of the enlarged Europe in relation to the rapidly changing international 
political, economic, social and cultural circumstances. In this respect, the problem 
of the new quality of the European Union is being repeatedly disputed. If the EU is 
to be something more than an arrangement for inter-state cooperation, the Union 
has to be able to act rationally on a collective basis, in a way that different interests 
or preferences will give priority to seeking agreement over self-interest 
maximization. The question of whether the EU envisaged in the Constitutional 
Treaty represents a deeper form of integration can be answered by examining its 
ability to achieve consensus on conflicting issues and to form a common will about 
how to solve common problems.2 The field in which the most controversies arise 
nowadays is that of biotechnology and biomedicine.  
 
Through the decoding of the human genome and development of biotechnologies 
we gain control over processes, which until now seemed to be uncontrollable and 
unforeseeable. The “line between the chance and the choice, forming the basis of 
our value system is shifting”3. This change is marked by great ambivalence. On the 
one hand, the advance of biological sciences carries a promise of benefit to humans, 
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since combined efforts of reproduction medicine and genetic engineering open up 
the prospect of gene-modifying interventions for therapeutic goals. On the other 
hand, modern genetics enables the cloning of human beings and gene 
manipulations, which may lead us to eugenic practices – entirely discredited in the 
course of the 20th century. This prospect casts a peculiar light on a condition of our 
normative self-understanding. Concerns focus on radical changes to the terms of 
human existence, to the currency of human relationship, to the boundaries of 
inclusion and exclusion, and to our cultural understanding of birth, life and death.4  
 
Consequently a whole range of values, such as human dignity, personal autonomy, 
relief of human suffering, welfare of the child and society’s well being, come into 
conflict. Within a state they are being transposed into the sphere of law and emerge 
as conflicts of fundamental rights, such as between the right to life and bodily 
integrity or the freedom of research and the duty of governments to best serve the 
health needs and other fundamental rights of their citizens. “The problem, [facing 
the government] (…) is precisely how conflicting claims are to be settled in the 
interest of the widest possible contribution to the interest of all, or at least of the 
great majority.”5  
 
This paper aims to address the problem of whether the constitutional provisions 
constitute a coherent European approach towards the controversial issues 
concerning biomedicine. Consequently, the answer to the question whether we can 
already speak of New European Bioethics and whether an approximation of the 
diverse European regulations is to be expected in the future has to be sought. 
Therefore, first of all, the normative differences between Member States and the 
underlying philosophical traditions need to be shortly presented. In the second part 
of the paper, the analysis of the EU competences as regards the area of public 
health and biomedical research will proceed. This will be followed by the 
interpretation of the legal limitations such as human dignity, which have been 
imposed on the latter in the course of the development of European law. As a 
conclusion an attempt to outline the prospective development of the European bio-
law will be provided. The analysis will concentrate on the vertical effect that the 
constitutional provisions have upon the Member States.  
                                                 
4 DERYCK BEYLEVELD & ROGER BROWNSWORD, HUMAN DIGNITY IN BIOETHICS AND BIOLAW 6 (2004). 
5 BETH SINGER, PRAGMATISM, RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY 127 (1999) (quoting JOHN DEWEY, LIBERALISM AND 
SOCIAL ACTION (1935). 
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B.  European Diversity 
 
The development of a European framework is perceived as a great challenge, for 
the Member States of the European Union are divided as to the legitimacy of the 
research and the approach to take to regulate it. Tensions within and between 
countries occur, as they try to balance these competing requirements, as for 
example in the field of stem cell research or pre-implantation genetic diagnosis 
(PGD). There are differences between regulatory and legislative positions, or lack of 
regulation, in the countries involved. This lack of consensus is largely grounded in 
conflicting views of the moral status of the embryo, but may also reflect a 
demarcation of what are understood to be legitimate areas for statutory 
intervention. Hence, in Denmark, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, the 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the UK embryo research (as well as PGD) is 
permitted, whereas Austria, Germany, Ireland and Italy have a ban. Luxemburg, 
Poland and Portugal have no specific rules on any of these problems.  
 
The legislative and regulatory frameworks, where they exist, have their origins in, 
and are subject to, historical, political and cultural particularities. For instance, the 
common law system is much more empiric, pragmatic and more susceptible to 
improvisation, attributable to specific historic developments, in the course of which 
judges and lawyers of the Crown played a crucial role.6 British law is also rightly 
associated with Mill’s ideology of robust individualism coupled with Benthamite 
utilitarianism, as well as political and economic liberalism.7 The price of liberty is 
that the mere preference of the majority (or of the “community”) must give way to 
the preferences of the contracting parties. Consequently, human dignity is seen 
primarily as a source of individual autonomy which should be respected. It will 
rarely be interpreted in a way that could possibly lead to a limitation of personal 
autonomy and the freedom of contracts that is crucial to the common law system. It 
is, thus, said to be conceptualized as empowerment rather than constraint.8 Apart 
from what has been stated above, what affects policy-making processes is the long 
parliamentary tradition which resulted in the constitutional principle of the 
supremacy of the Parliament.  
 
On the other side of the European normative scene one can find Germany with its 
abstract and theoretical restrictive approach. Like the rest of the continent it is 
deeply rooted in the Kantian moral philosophy, which orders treatment of the 
                                                 
6 KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOETZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 68 (1998). 
7 BEYLEVELD & BROWNSWARD, supra note 4, at 1-47. 
8 Id. at 1. 
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moral agent as an end and never merely as a means. Still, to a much larger extent 
the German legislation has been determined by the historic experience of the Nazi 
regime, which tried to implement their discriminatory social theory through 
national programs of eugenic practices. In Austria and Italy the law has been 
deeply affected by the philosophy of ontological personalism, stemming from the 
Christian tradition, in which the absolute right to life is ascribed to a human being 
from conception onwards. This subjective right is thus inferred from the mere 
potentiality of an entity to develop into a person in the future. This broad apparent 
interpretation is strictly connected with the concept of human dignity. It has been 
argued that in continental Europe human dignity is predominantly being 
interpreted as a constraint.9 Thus, the continental understanding of human dignity 
implies not only a duty to respect the dignity of others, but also not to compromise 
one’s own dignity, even if such a compromise would be intended by the person at 
stake. It also requires acting in a way that is compatible with the vision of human 
dignity that exists in a particular community. Consequently, if hypothetical conflict 
between dignity and autonomy occurs, the idea of the former predominant in the 
society will precede and limit the latter.  
 
In Poland and Portugal the lack of specific regulations seems to be the consequence 
of both the influence of the Catholic Church and the great economic, social and 
cultural changes that have been taking place for the last 15-20 years. Conservative 
morality coupled with the victorious march of economic liberalism seems to create 
rather unfavorable conditions for a bioethical debate. Interestingly enough it seems 
to be the medical environment, which, being predominantly conservative, prevents 
the changes. This great dissonance between the legal and philosophical traditions of 
the EU Member States constitutes a substantial impediment to the unification of 
bio-law.  
 
C.  The Constitutional Treaty 
I.  Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU 
 
1.  General Remarks 
 
Principles of liberty, equality, solidarity and respect for human rights constitute 
among others the founding values of the EU. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the EU, incorporated into the Constitutional Treaty (CT) as Part II, contains a whole 
range of social rights, including, quite surprisingly for a document of this sort, both 
categories of human rights, namely those of the so-called first and second 
                                                 
9 Id. at 34.   
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generations. For the first time at the supranational level a due regard is given to the 
area of biomedicine in a legal act, intended to obtain a legally binding force.10  
 
First of all, drawing inspiration from the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, it proclaims the inviolability of human dignity, which must be respected 
and protected and confirms everyone’s right to life.11 Secondly, it introduces the 
right to the physical and mental integrity of a person, stemming from Art. 3 of the 
Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being 
with regard to the application of biology and medicine (European Biomedicine 
Convention). The Charter’s right encompasses the free and informed consent of the 
patient as well as the ban on eugenic practices, commoditization of human body 
parts and the human reproductive cloning.12 Thirdly, broadening the scope of the 
well-established non-discrimination principle, it prohibits discrimination on 
grounds of genetic features. Finally, it declares the freedom of scientific research 
and the right to preventive health care. All these rights and freedoms constitute a 
quite admirable catalogue. However, as we all know, due to a whole range of 
different provisions their scope of application has been drastically constrained. 
Consequently, the normative dimension of the Charter appears to be extremely 
complex and ambiguous.  
 
2.  Limitations 
 
First of all, Art. II-111 CT restricts the applicability of the Charter’s rights primarily 
to the institutions, bodies of the Union, and Member States in compliance with the 
principle of subsidiarity. This is usually understood to have waived the horizontal 
effect of the Charter, namely the one between citizens. Moreover, the requirement 
to respect the Charter’s rights is binding on the Member States only when they act 
in the scope of Union law. This limitation aims to prevent any reliance on the 
norms of the Charter in relation to mere domestic law of the Member States in areas 
which are still not determined by EU law. On the other hand, some argue that it 
will be extremely difficult to explain this distinction between national and EU law 
to the citizens.13 Also, in view of the fact that EU law is increasingly invading 
                                                 
10 The symbolic role and standard-setting function of the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 
cannot be denied. Still, the fact that it has been ratified only by an extremely small number of states 
substantially limits its actual legal impact.  
11 The European Convention, Updated Explanations relating to the text of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
828 CONV 1 (July 18, 2003). 
12 Id. at 6. 
13 EUROPEAN UNION COMMITTEE, 14th REPORT: THE FUTURE OF EUROPE: “SOCIAL EUROPE,”2003-14, HL 
Paper 79 (2003) at ¶ 13, available at http://hcl1.hclibrary.parliament.uk/notes/sps/snsp-02906.pdf.    
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domestic law, it may be presumed that this distinction will not have a long life, like 
in the USA as regards federal and state law.14 As regards the horizontal effect, it is 
believed that the ECJ could well solve the problem of Art. II-111 CT (similarly to 
that of the horizontal effect of EU-Directives). It could, thus, declare under certain 
circumstances the liability of Member States to an individual for losses caused by 
the lack of implementation of the Charter provisions (hence conferring the 
Francovich doctrine).15  
 
Further restrictions are foreseen by paragraph 2 and the second sentence of the 
paragraph 1 of Art. II-111 CT.16 They confirm that the Charter may not have the 
effect of extending or modifying the competences conferred on the Union. 
Consequently, the obligation for the Union’s institutions to promote principles laid 
down in the Charter may arise only within the limits of these same powers. The 
foregoing provisions create a solid constraint in areas, where the ambitions of the 
Charter exceed the catalogue of competences of the Union. However, one should 
remember that the extension of competences is not tantamount to an extension of 
EU law as such, in a frame of a regulatory development of community law within 
the existing competences. The discussed article does not seem to prohibit the latter. 
Thus, the EU institutions are perfectly allowed to extend current EU law for 
instance in the field of health protection or research, for in doing so they are not 
extending the field of application of EU law beyond the powers defined in the 
Constitution.17 Of course, at the same time they have to pay attention to Art. II-112 
(2) CT, which imposes the obligation to exercise fundamental rights under the 
conditions and within the limits defined in other parts of the Constitution.18  
 
All these reservations result in a quite blurred picture of the protection of 
fundamental rights and make their normative effect rather vague. The fact that the 
rights of the individual have possibly been curtailed by the horizontal clauses is 
rightly viewed as unsatisfactory, since it does not really meet the objectives layed 
down by the Constitutional Convention. Thus, such an approach scarcely serves the 
interests of transparency or makes those rights visible to the citizen.19 On the other 
                                                 
14 A.T.J.M. JACOBS, THE FENCES SURROUNDING THE CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE NEW 
EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION 8 (2004), available at 
www.tilburguniversity.nl/faculties/frw/research/schoordijk/ctld. (P.J.G. Kapteyn) 
15 Id. at 4. 
16 Art. II-111 CT.  
17 JACOBS, supra note 14, at 5. 
18 Art. II-112 (2) CT. 
19 HL Paper, supra note 13, at para. 84. 
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hand, the limits of the enforceability of the Charter rights allowed the UK, the most 
radical opponent, to agree to the incorporation of the Charter in the Constitutional 
Treaty, and thus to ascribe it, even if limited, a legally binding force. This widely 
discussed ambivalence is particularly visible in relation to the specific fundamental 
rights concerning biomedicine. 
 
II.  Biomedical Research in the Constitutional Treaty  
 
1.  Freedom of Research 
 
“From the perspective of the liberal state, the freedom of science and research is 
entitled to legal guarantees, for any enhancement of the scope of technological 
control over nature is bound up with the economic promise of gains in prosperity 
and with the political prospect of enlarging the scope of individual choice.”20 The 
European Union seems to share this view. Thus, by means of Art. I-3 of the CT the 
promotion of the scientific and technological advance constitutes one of the Union’s 
objectives.21 To achieve this goal Member States confirmed as a fundamental right 
the freedom of research and have equipped the EU with a range of shared 
competences. The former has been ensured by means of Art. II-73 of the CT, the 
freedom of scientific research and the respect for academic freedom22; the latter by 
provisions to be found in Part III of the CT.  
 
Thus, the freedom of scientific research and the respect for academic freedom can 
be deduced from the freedom of thoughts and expression stated in Art. 10 of the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms (ECHR). It includes the right “to receive and impart information and ideas 
without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers”, which consti-
tutes the basic conditions for each individual’s self-fulfillment23. Despite the fact that 
no explicit reference has been made, the Charter’s freedom could be also related to 
the Art. 15 of the European Biomedicine Convention.24 It justifies the freedom of 
scientific research in the field of biology and medicine not only by humanity's right 
                                                 
20 HABERMAS supra note 3, at 25.  
21 Art. I-3 CT. 
22 Art. II-73 CT. 
23 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 
art. 10(1), 5 E.T.S. 13. 
24 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the 
Application of Biology and Medicine (Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine), Apr. 4, 1997, art. 
15, 164 E.T.S. 5. 
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to knowledge, but also by the considerable progress its results may bring in terms 
of the health and well-being of patients.25 Such an extensive interpretation, if ap-
proved by courts, could appear to liberalize the area of research in the EU. This 
quite remote link could be drawn through the provision of para. 5 of the Charter’s 
Preamble according to which the Charter reaffirms the rights as they result, among 
other sources, from the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. 
 
However, following the international standards, the freedom of research contained 
in the CT is not absolute. The horizontal clause of Art. II-112(1) CT provides 
possibility for constraints, as long as they respect the essence of the freedom. 
Additionally, by means of Art. II-112(3) CT academic freedom can be subject to the 
limitations under conditions enumerated in Art. 10(2) of the ECHR. In the same 
vein, the Charter does not prevent Member States from applying accordingly Art. 
15 of the latter document, which under special circumstances allows the derogation 
of Convention’s rights. On the other hand, the effect of the freedom of research 
needs to be analyzed from a much broader perspective. 
 
In order to prevent Art. I-3 and Art. II-73 CT from becoming a dead letter, the EU is 
entitled by means of Art. I-14 CT “to carry out activities, in particular to define and 
implement programs”26 in the areas of research and technological development. 
Para. 3 of the quoted provision ends by stating that “the exercise of that competence 
shall not result in Member States being prevented from exercising theirs”. It gives 
each country the ability to raise the competitiveness of its products through 
research, avoiding at the same time the confrontation over this in such controversial 
matters as embryonic stem cells.  
 
2.  EU Competences 
 
Further provisions may be found in Art. III-248 to III-251 of the CT; however, they 
do not constitute a substantial modification, in comparison to the existing 
provisions of Art. 163-173 TEC. Art. III-248 CT establishes a European Research 
Area in which researchers, scientific knowledge and technology circulate freely, 
and encourages it to become more competitive, including in its industry, while 
promoting all the research activities deemed necessary by virtue of other Chapters 
of the Constitution. This is a more ambitious rendering of Art. 163 TEC, which 
                                                 
25 EXPLANATORY REPORT TO THE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND DIGNITY OF 
THE HUMAN BEING WITH REGARD TO THE APPLICATION OF BIOLOGY AND MEDICINE: CONVENTION ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND BIOMEDICINE, Dec. 17, 1996, art.15, 164 E.T.S. 17, available at 
www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Reports/Html/164.htm. 
26 Art I-14 CT. 
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simply provides that the EU shall “have the objective of strengthening the scientific 
and technological bases of Community industry”.27 Art. III-250(2) CT specifies that 
the Commission’s initiatives in this area would aim to establish “guidelines and 
indicators, the organization of exchange of best practice, and the preparation of the 
necessary elements for periodic monitoring and evaluation.”28 It also provides that 
the EP should be kept “fully informed.”  
 
In my view, it is the foregoing provisions coupled with the freedom of research 
guarantee that have the biggest influence on the development of biomedicine and 
bioethics in the EU. Due to this EU competence it eventually became possible to 
finance stem cell research projects through the recent Sixth Framework Program 
(2002-2006). Despite such progress, problems still emerge. Researchers feel insecure 
and exposed to risk, since in some countries certain kinds of embryo research and 
gene patenting are penalized.29 Nevertheless, the powers and duties conferred 
upon the Union, strengthened in the Constitutional Treaty, seem to be flexible 
enough to encourage the exchange of knowledge. Thus, the bigger the demand of 
the market and the need expressed by the researchers, the deeper the 
harmonization of standards that can be expected. This is actually already 
happening. The researchers of the Eurostem project have recommended that the 
funding policy of the EU should be aligned and made consistent with the principles 
identified in the framework program and should not disadvantage researchers in 
any Member States.30 Moreover, the reinforced non-discrimination principle 
coupled with the free movement of persons, goods and services will inevitably 
encourage the approximation of bio-law at the supranational level. First signs of 
harmonization are already present in the European Constitution, which sets 
minimal standards of biomedical practice. Furthermore, what is even more 
important, it treats human dignity as the source of all human rights and as a border 
line for any interference with personal autonomy. Is the European bioethics 
promoted by the EU permissive or restrictive? What impact do these delimiting 
principles have on the creation of common philosophical and most of all legal 
standards? 
 
                                                 
27 The Treaty establishing the European Community, Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 163 [hereinafter EC 
Treaty], available at www.europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/en/treaties/dat/12002E/htm/C_2002325EN. 
003301.html.   
28 Art III-250(2) CT. 
29 Louise Irving, Creating an Ethical Framework for Stem Cell Research in Europe, 305 BIONEWS 1 2 (2005), 
available at  www.BioNews.org.uk/commentaries.lasso (quoting John Harris).  
30 Id. at 3.  
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III.  The Limits of Biomedical Research and Practice31  
 
1.  Human Dignity and the Notion of Personhood 
 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU takes into consideration the 
circumstances that procreation and birth are losing the element of natural 
uncontrollability that so far was essential for our normative self-understanding. 
The first article of the Charter (Art. II-61 CT) proclaims the inviolability of human 
dignity that should be respected and protected.32 In accordance with the 
explanatory report, human dignity of the person is not only a fundamental right in 
itself, but also constitutes the real basis of fundamental rights. This definition is 
vague and ambiguous. “If the interpretation of morally saturated legal terms like 
‘human right’ and ‘human dignity’ tend to be counter intuitively construed in too 
broad a sense, they will not only lose their power to provide clear conceptual 
distinctions, but also their critical potential.”33  
 
In order to identify the distinctive elements, it may be reasonable to analyze the 
right to life, guaranteed by Art. II-62 CT, which is ascribed to “everyone”. The term 
“everyone” (as reaffirmed in the Explanatory Report to the Charter) is copied from 
the language of the ECHR. In neither document is this term defined. However, in 
the case Paton v. Great Britain, the European Commission of Human Rights34 stated 
that the term “everyone” does not include in its scope the nasciturus. The 
limitations foreseen in Art. 2 of the ECHR apply only to persons already born and 
can be applied neither to a fetus, nor to an embryo. “Everyone” seems to refer to 
the potentially contested concept of a bearer of human rights. This is to be 
contrasted with the notion of “human being”, apparently signaling “a generally 
accepted principle that human dignity and the identity of the human being [must] 
be respected as soon as life begins.”35 Nevertheless, in the recent case of Vo v. 
France, The European Court of Human Rights has reminded that the convention 
institutions have not “ruled out the possibility that in certain circumstances 
safeguards may be extended to the unborn child. (...) It is also clear from an 
examination of these cases that the issue has always been determined by weighing 
up various and sometimes conflicting, rights or freedoms...”.36 How can we then 
                                                 
31 The analysis is mostly based on BEYEVELD & BROWNSWORD supra, note 4. 
32 Art II-61 CT. 
33 Eriksen, supra note 2, at 36. 
34 Paton v. Great Britain, App No. 8416/79, 19 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 244, para. 24 (1980). 
35 See, supra, note 24 at 5. 
36 Vo v. France, 2004-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R.  para. 80. 
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define the bearer of human rights, if it is understood differently in each of the 
Member States?  
 
If we start with the view that the possession of human rights extends only to 
developed humans, who have their faculties, then “everyone” will not include 
“every living person”. In this view, the paradigmatic bearer of human rights will be 
the person who is able to exercise his or her rights. If we take a less restrictive view, 
we might hold that “everyone” covers all independent human life, that is, all 
humans from the cradle to the grave. Even in this less restrictive view, though, 
there are non-qualifying members of the human species, such as embryos, fetuses, 
and the like. This is not to say that potential qualifying human beings merit no 
protection but simply that, in the absence of a functioning capacity for practical 
reasoning or independent existence, the case for protection of such life forms 
cannot be made out as if they were bearers of human rights. We might, however, 
also hold that “everyone” includes “every instance of human life, biologically 
defined”. In this relaxed view, the possession and protection of human rights 
applies from conception onwards. In this respect, the European Court of Human 
Rights has held that “it is neither desirable, nor even possible as matters stand, to 
answer in the abstract the question whether the unborn child is a person for the 
purposes of Article 2 of the Convention.”37 
 
The Constitutional Treaty appears to follow the above mentioned reasoning. 
Therefore, it seems to foster a compromise, already applied in the Biomedicine 
Convention. While those, who cannot agree that the conceptus is a bearer of human 
rights, are to be allowed to persist with this belief, all Member States are required to 
accept that, in the name of human dignity, the conceptus is a protected entity. This, 
however, is not without any implications for the centrality of autonomy; it is not as 
though dignity simply functions to protect life where autonomy runs out. Rather, if 
embryonic and fetal life “is protected under the cover of respect for human dignity, 
then the autonomous choices of researchers [e.g. to create, test, manipulate, and 
store embryos] and of women must be measured for the legitimacy against, not 
only the general regime of human rights, but also against the special dignity-based 
regime protecting such early human life”38. By reference to respect for human 
dignity, embryonic and potential human life forms have a protected moral status. 
The acceptance of human dignity as providing direct protection for early human 
life represents, at the very least, a significant change to the terms of debate. It 
almost certainly signals a much more restrictive approach to early-stage biomedical 
interventions. 
                                                 
37 Id. at para. 85. 
38 HABERMAS, supra note 3, at 33. 
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2.  Discrimination on the Ground of Genetic Features 
 
Even greater ambivalence is related to the non-discrimination principle, stated in 
Art. II-81 CT, by means of which the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds 
of genetic features was introduced.39 It goes in line with the limitations stemming 
from the value of human dignity. However, the practical effect of this may cause 
great concerns. This provision, which draws on Art. 11 of the Biomedicine 
Convention, does not create any power to enact anti-discrimination laws. It only 
addresses discriminations by the institutions and bodies of the Union themselves, 
when exercising the power conferred on them by Member States, and by Member 
States when they are implementing Union law. Surprisingly enough Art. III-124 CT, 
which confers power on the Union to adopt legislation and encourage 
harmonization, does not mention genetic feature as a discriminatory ground.40 This 
state of law, which stems probably from the highly differentiated labor and 
insurance legal systems, should be viewed as unsatisfactory, for it will prolong the 
harmonization of such an important aspect. It is a well known fact that insurers and 
employers constitute extremely important pressure groups, which attempt to 
circumvent any final solutions as regard genetic tests. The conflict of interests 
appears so great that regulation meets horrendous obstacles even at the national 
level. 
 
IV. Biomedical Practices 
 
The attempt to create a modern act, which would address the most important 
problems resulting from the rapid biotechnological developments, is reflected in 
the drafting of Art. II-63 CT. It guarantees the right to bodily and mental integrity, 
which has been recognized by the ECJ in 2001.41 Apart form confirming the well 
established principle of free and informed consent, it contains “the prohibition of 
eugenic practices, in particular those that have as their goal the selection of 
persons”, as well as “the prohibition of the reproductive cloning of human 
beings”.42 All these provisions are based on the Biomedicine Convention; thus, due 
regard must be given to it in the course of their interpretation. Stemming from the 
concept of human dignity they also constitute further limitations to the freedom of 
medical and academic research. 
 
                                                 
39 Art II-81 CT. 
40 Art III-118 CT. 
41 Case C-377/98, Netherlands v. EP and the Council, 2001 E.C.R. I-7079, paras. 199-215.  
42 Art II-63(2) CT. 
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The first paragraph, that acknowledges the conception of personal autonomy, 
seems to be rooted in both the Kantian moral philosophy and Mill’s liberal 
individualism. This seemingly clear article may cause problems in situations, where 
the person is not capable of judging his/her own action, as in the case of pre-
personal life. It is commonly accepted that in the course of the medical procedure 
(e.g. in vitro fertilization) the burden of decision is conferred upon the gamete 
provider (donor). What happens, however, if the interests of the donor conflict with 
the interests of the recipient? The problem becomes even more complex in the case 
of preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD). Here the embryo, which undergoes a 
test and at the beginning, is treated as a patient43 and, if a genetic disorder is 
detected, will have eventually to be discarded. Whose informed consent is needed 
then? The CT does not provide any answer to these problems, leaving the solution 
to each of the Member States. The only limitation seems to stem from the obligation 
to respect and protect human dignity. The reasons have already been stated above. 
Moreover, it is also questionable whether such a detailed issue should be regulated 
at the constitutional level.  
 
Personal and mental integrity goes along with the ban on the so-called 
commoditization of body parts. The need to prevent such a tendency has been also 
recognized in the above mentioned European Court of Justice (ECJ) decision, 
concerning EU Directive EC 44/98.44 A prohibition of trafficking in human beings 
in Art. II-63 CT is said to stem directly from the cornerstone principle of respect for 
human dignity. The fact, however, that the Directive has been implemented only by 
a few countries raises the question of whether in the field of gene patenting it is 
possible to speak of common, European-wide standards? From a European 
perspective it can be hard to see how particular moral conceptions of the individual 
countries can feasibly be accommodated in a collective patent system. The ECJ did 
point out that the directive sets out the framework for the concept of the 
patentability. The directive regulates an area in which there are no actual 
authorities as yet. Thus, further jurisprudence of the ECJ will have to clarify the 
specific provisions. It is, however, at least arguable that the idea of human dignity 
constitutes a good reason for restraining certain forms of biocommerce. The 
Constitution, therefore, signals a European view that freedom of contract should be 
so limited.45 
                                                 
43 The case of PGD raises some confusion as to who is actually the patient. Is it the mother or the 
embryo? The answer to this question depends largely on the concept of the patient-doctor relation. A 
liberal approach will see the mother as a patient, whereas a more restrictive one will speak in favor of an 
embryo. See  ZBIGNIEW SZAWARSKI, Ethics and prenatal screening, IN BIOPOLITIK GRENZENLOS- STIMMEN 
AUS POLEN 107-121 (Heidi Hofmann ed., 2005).   
44 Case C-377/98, Netherlands v. EP and the Council, 2001 E.C.R. I-7079, paras. 199-215. 
45 BEYLEVELD & BROWNSWORD, supra note 4, at 217. 
1706                                                                                       [Vol. 06  No. 11  G E R M A N  L A W  J O U R N A L  
As far as the ban on eugenic practices is concerned, it relates to situations “in which 
selection programs are organized and implemented, involving campaigns for 
sterilization, forced pregnancy and other acts deemed to be international crimes in 
the Statute of the International Criminal Court…”46 It is, however, interesting that 
no reference has been made to prenatal testing and PGD, that may also lead to such 
an outcome. It is exactly the risk of discriminatory practices and negative eugenics 
that lies behind the controversies around PGD. Yet, if PGD for medical reasons can 
be justified under such provisions, would the same apply to sex selection for social 
reasons? The fact that in this respect the legislator did not follow the solutions 
provided by the Biomedicine Convention, banning the sex selection for non-
medical reasons, may suggest that such an omission was intended. It is noteworthy 
that although such sex selection on social grounds is not permitted in any Member 
State, the number of adherents to this solution is gradually increasing.47  
 
Unlike the former provisions, the absolute ban on reproductive cloning should be 
viewed positively. It is in fact the only issue, as to which the international 
community is able to reach a compromise. Its significance is therefore indisputable. 
However, one should not forget that its effect does not exceed the scope of Union 
law. It follows the solution of the additional protocol adopted on reproductive 
cloning by Council of Europe.48 The Biomedicine Convention uses the term person 
in relation to the post-natal phase of human life, whereas the term human being 
seems to be broader and applies to the whole human species, regardless of the 
phase of its development. It means that by referring to “human beings”, the Charter 
prohibits the cloning not only of an existing person, but also the reproductive 
cloning of embryos. Real problems occur in respect of the so-called therapeutic 
cloning. The difference lies purely in the purpose of the procedure. Reproductive 
cloning aims at the birth of a cloned child, whereas the latter is used only for 
research purposes. The Charter neither authorizes nor prohibits any cloning other 
than reproductive forms of cloning. It means a more restrictive approach can be 
chosen by Member States. This provision is important insofar as embryo research 
programs include cloning of human beings, such as the program recently granted 
                                                 
46 The European Convention, Updated Explanations relating to the text of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
828 CONV 1 (July 18, 2003). 
47 HUMAN FERTILISATION AND EMBRYOLOGY AUTHORITY, SEX SELECTION: OPTIONS FOR REGULATION. A 
REPORT ON THE HFEA’S 2002-03 REVIEW OF SEX SELECTION INCLUDING A DISCUSSION OF LEGISLATIVE AND 
REGULATORY OPTIONS para. 84-92 (2003). 
48 Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human 
Being with Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine, on the Prohibition of Cloning Human 
Beings, Jan. 12, 1998, No. 168, 1 E.T.S. 2, available at 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=168&CM=1&DF=&CL=ENG.   
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to a team at the Newcastle University by the Human Fertilization and Embryology 
Authority in London.49  
  
D.  Conclusions 
 
Ethical biopractice needs guiding values that cover those cases where the capacity 
for autonomous judgment is impaired or not yet developed. To put it another way, 
where there is respect for autonomy, autonomous actors can take care of 
themselves, but non-autonomous human life must be protected. The new European 
bioethics takes dignity, integrity and vulnerability to be the guiding protective 
values alongside autonomy. It becomes clear that its agenda, in correcting for the 
weight given to autonomy, is not about restoring physicians’ power over their 
patients but about asserting collective control over individual choice. Thus, the 
“European bioethical project could be said to be both, ambitious and modest. Its 
ambitiousness resides in its attempt to articulate a vision of human dignity that 
commands acceptance across a region as pluralistic as Europe; its modest nature, by 
contrast, resides in its lack of concern with defensibility beyond acceptance – if X is 
accepted, then X requires no further justification. Or to put it another way, the 
project is more interested in breadth (of acceptance) than in depth (of 
justification).”50 When the acceptance of a biopractice is broad enough within a 
community and later reaches the critical point within a state, then a change of 
legislation will follow. The same inference seems to have been applied to the 
supranational level. One could ask whether these traditional European value 
orientations, however worthy, have not already become merely out-of-date 
fashions. 
 
On the other hand, from the sociological perspective, it is unlikely that society’s 
acceptance of the alliance between state and technology will lessen, as long as the 
instrumentalization of “humanity’s inner nature”51 can be medically justified by the 
prospect of better health and a prolonged lifespan. The wish to be autonomous in 
the conduct of one’s own life is always connected with the collective goals of health 
and the prolongation of lifespan. The history of medicine, therefore, strongly 
suggests a skeptical attitude toward any attempt at “moralizing human nature”.52 
                                                 
49 The Treaty establishing the European Community, Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 163 [hereinafter EC 
Treaty], available at www.europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/lex/en/treaties/dat/12002E/htm/C_2002325EN.003301.html.   
50 BEYLEVELD & BROWNSWORD, supra note 4, at 248. 
51 HABERMAS, supra note 3, at 48. 
52 HABERMAS, supra note 3, at 32 (quoting W. VAN DEN DAELE, DIE NATUERLICHKEIT DES MENSCHEN ALS 
KRITERIUM UND SCHRANKE TECHNISCHER EINGRIFFE (2000). 
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Nevertheless, it ought to be remembered that no science will relieve common sense, 
even if scientifically informed, of the task of forming a judgment on the latest 
achievements of the biotechnological revolution.53 If J. Habermas is right, and this 
seems to be the tendency, a further liberalization of the European legislation should 
proceed.  
 
Paradoxically, the Union’s motto, “Unity in diversity”, expressed in Art. I-8 of the 
CT could enable this process.54 It seems to reflect particularly the approach taken in 
the document as regards the most controversial issues. Together with the principles 
of subsidiarity and proportionality underlined in a number of instances, it leaves 
space for differentiation and will presumably be used by Member States to preserve 
sovereignty. Within modern societies, however, there is a plurality of values and 
competing views about the notion of good life among different groups, local 
communities and cultures. Democratic pragmatism describes the mental state of a 
many-voiced public, where the arguments of both majority and minority should be 
heard. The modern state is premised on the axis: right of individual – safeguarding 
of individual rights. As a response the European Constitutional Treaty underlines, 
in a number of different ways, the fact that the Union is a community of shared 
values. “These values are common to the Member States in a society in which 
pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between 
women and men prevail.”55 At the same time, the Constitutional Treaty aims at 
making it possible for different groups and subgroups to live together under shared 
law. They have to resolve their conflicts through the medium of law, while the 
Union remains, in principle, neutral regarding different conceptions of the good 
life.  
 
Nevertheless, the Constitutional Treaty sets out a common standard, to which all 
state-parties had to assent. Moreover, the framework for deliberative processes in 
the Constitutional Treaty itself, even if extremely complex, has been set. The 
increasing role of the European Parliament constitutes an important element of the 
development of a common sphere, where an open and unconstrained dialogue 
could be undertaken. Critics have often pointed out that the Constitutional Treaty, 
due to its ambiguity and complexity, does not meet its primary goal of bringing the 
Union closer to the citizen. Still, despite its limited scope of application, the 
significant role of the Charter is not merely symbolic. It should not be forgotten 
that, after all, through their incorporation into the CT fundamental rights will 
                                                 
53 HABERMAS, supra note 3, at 109.  
54 Art I-8 CT. 
55 Art I-2 CT. 
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become legally binding. Apart from what has been said, there is the possibility that 
the rights and principles set out in the Constitutional Treaty will in practice 
impinge on national policy and practice and limit the freedom of Member States 
even in areas that remain clearly within their competence. It may prove difficult for 
a state to resist pressure to change and to align itself with the Charter. Where the 
competences are mixed and even where the Union has a supporting competence, 
the “higher” Union standard will inevitably exert pressure on national 
governments.56  
 
Moreover, Art. II-112 CT indicates three sources for the content of Charter’s rights, 
namely EU law, the ECHR and national law. The still existing lack of efficiency and 
cohesion resulting from the parallel application of three systems of human rights 
protection will most probably be reduced by the accession of the EU to the ECHR, 
as provided by Art. I-9 CT.57 Thus, a further approximation can be expected, 
especially now that para. 5 of the Preamble of the Constitutional Treaty opens the 
possibility for the extension of the sources from which the ECJ will draw 
inspiration. This could also result in future harmonization. This process is 
obviously reciprocal, since impulses run in two directions: from the Member States 
to the Union and from the Union to the states. There is no reason why this should 
change with the new Constitution. Thus, the conclusion cannot be revolutionary. 
The Constitutional Treaty may not be perfect, yet it constitutes progress. It is the 
only possible compromise that could be reached at this point of time and at this 
level of unification. For this reason its significance should not be underestimated. 
Whether pragmatism will be the guiding principle of biomedicine in the enlarged 
European Union in the future is still to be seen. 
                                                 
56 Lords Select Committee on the EU, 6th Report: The Future Status of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, 2003-3, H.L. Paper 48 at 98-99.  
57 The European Convention, Working group 2, “Incorporation of the Charter/Accession to the ECHR”, 
Modalities and consequences of incorporation into the Treaties of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and accession 
of the Community/Union to the ECHR  17-22, 116 CONV 02 (Jun. 18, 2002).  
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